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**LIKE GIVING A LOADED, PROMPTED GUN TO A CYBERNETIC  
CHILD: LIMITS AND GAME CHANGERS IN TODAY'S HYPERREAL  
GEOPOLITICS**

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**Abstract:** It is an obvious fact that the arrival of artificial neural networks, machine learning models or—following humanity's tendency to exaggerate its own creations—Artificial Intelligence, has changed certain aspects of the world. From the quasi-magical creation of what, for some, is art and, for others, imposture; to financial calculations operating in non-human timeframes (HFT), and the socio-political changes triggered by new technologies (from blockchain to fake news), these developments have forced us to rethink our relationship with these cutting-edge technologies. Their portability and global reach have reshaped the geopolitical landscape, allowing misinformation-promoting influencers to reach the European Parliament or even a president to entangle an entire state in a crypto pyramid scheme. What considerations should we take into account when facing a hyperreal bull in a china shop? First, we must understand how communication has changed, both in its form and content. Information has become increasingly fragmented, transmitted in intervals that transform individual cognition. Paradoxically, the content of information is increasingly impoverished: hoaxes, contextless images, conspiracy theories, alarmism, fatalism, and sensationalism. That said, how should we engage with new technologies? The chaotic nature of algorithmically processed information may push us toward an oracular relationship with Artificial Intelligence, as Yuval Harari suggests. The laws governing geopolitics have also changed, reaching the landscapes described by theory-fiction or the cyberpunk philosophy of CCRU, where hyperstition opened the portal to a reality-fictional world. What cannot be ignored is the material reality of all this—the fact that these technologies have a direct impact on ecosystems within the context of a catastrophic ecological and resource crisis. Moreover, these technologies have once again been built upon the plundering of intellectual property and the general intellect of workers without their consent. Which should be the new episteme that should rule the relationship with these new technologies?

**Keywords:** Artificial Intelligence, Misinformation, Hyperstition, Accelerationism, Ecology, Geopolitics, Hyperreality

## **CA ȘI CUM AI DA O ARMĂ ÎNCĂRCATĂ ȘI GATA DE TRAGERE UNUI COPIL CIBERNETIC: LIMITE ȘI FACTORI DE SCHIMBARE ÎN GEOPOLITICA HIPERREALISTĂ DE ASTĂZI**

**Rezumat:** Este evident că apariția rețelelor neuronale artificiale, a modelelor de învățare automată sau – urmând tendința umanității de a-și exagera propriile creații – a Inteligenței Artificiale, a schimbat anumite aspecte ale lumii. De la creația cvasi-magică a ceea ce, pentru unii, este artă și, pentru alții, impostură; la calculele financiare care operează în intervale de timp non-umane (HFT) și schimbările socio-politice declanșate de noile tehnologii (de la blockchain la știri false), aceste evoluții ne-au obligat să ne regândim relația cu aceste tehnologii de ultimă generație. Portabilitatea și acoperirea lor globală au remodelat peisajul geopolitic, permițând influențelor care promovează dezinformarea să ajungă la Parlamentul European sau chiar unui președinte să implice un întreg stat într-o schemă piramidală de criptomonede. Ce aspecte ar trebui să luăm în considerare atunci când ne confruntăm cu un taur hiperreal într-un magazin de porțelanuri? În primul rând, trebuie să înțelegem cum s-a schimbat comunicarea, atât în ceea ce privește forma, cât și conținutul. Informația a devenit din ce în ce mai fragmentată, fiind transmisă în intervale care transformă cunoașterea individuală. Paradoxal, conținutul informației este din ce în ce mai sărac: știri false, imagini fără context, teorii ale conspirației, alarmism, fatalism și senzaționalism. Acestea fiind spuse, cum ar trebui să interacționăm cu noile tehnologii? Natura haotică a informației prelucrate algoritmic ne-ar putea împinge către o relație de tip oracular cu Inteligența Artificială, așa cum sugerează Yuval Harari. Legile care guvernează geopolitica s-au schimbat, de asemenea, ajungând la peisajele descrise de teoria ficțiunii sau de filosofia cyberpunk a CCRU, unde hiperstitiona a deschis portalul către o lume real-fictivă. Ceea ce nu poate fi ignorat este realitatea materială a tuturor acestor lucruri – faptul că aceste tehnologii au un impact direct asupra ecosistemelor în contextul unei crize ecologice și de resurse catastrofale. Mai mult, aceste tehnologii au fost construite încă o dată pe baza jefuirii proprietății intelectuale și a intelectului general al muncitorilor fără consimțământul acestora. Care ar trebui să fie noua epistemă care să guverneze relația cu aceste noi tehnologii?

**Cuvinte-cheie:** Inteligență artificială, dezinformare, hiperstitione, acceleraționism, ecologie, geopolitică, hiperrealitate.

## 1. Introduction: living (in) (the) *Idiocracy*

In our times, albeit indirectly, the latest technological-digital transformation has revealed signs of a radical shift in the global communication and geopolitics that must be analyzed carefully. Maybe it would be helpful to draw a parallel between two pictures: one fictional that borders on reality and another real that borders on fiction. The 2006 movie *Idiocracy* (Dir. Mike Judge), envisioned a dystopian future where society has been devastated by the glorification of ignorance. In this world, the intellectual elite has disappeared, and the masses—alienated by mindless entertainment and instant gratification—have elevated Dwayne Elizondo Mountain Dew Herbert Camacho, a former professional wrestler, to the presidency of the free world. In one of his speeches, amid machine-gun fire and euphoric cheers, Camacho does not offer solutions—only pure spectacle. Now, let's move to the present. Half a year ago, we witnessed former WWE wrestler Hulk Hogan giving a speech at a Trump campaign event, tearing his shirt and appealing to the pre-rational emotions of the crowd, shouting “they tried to kill my brother!” More recently, we saw Argentina's president, Javier Milei, gifting a giant chainsaw—straight out of a comic book—to the crypto-fascist mogul Elon Musk.

The connection is immediate and disturbing: once again, politics is not built on knowledge, merit, or strategic vision but on brute force, theatrics, and resonance with an audience that prioritizes emotion over reason. What once seemed like humorous exaggeration—designed to provoke laughter and reflection—now feels like an X-ray of certain aspects of contemporary society. Not only has politics been increasingly turned into an obscene spectacle, but the cult of ignorance has also led to a disdain for science and knowledge. From climate change denial to the chaotic explosion of misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic, and conspiracy theories like QAnon, reality has shown that anti-intellectualism is not just a joke, but a tangible problem. Political speeches are filled with meaningless

phrases but with high emotional impact. Many leaders have replaced rational discourse with short, direct messages full of empty but effective slogans. Phrases like Trump's "*Make America Great Again*", are examples of how political speech has been reduced to marketing catchy phrases, rather than complex arguments. In *Idiocracy*, elections are not based on the rational analysis of candidates but on who is more charismatic or entertaining. Democracy has been reduced to a popularity contest. Social media has transformed election campaigns into a spectacle where image, charisma, and memes play a more decisive role than political proposals. A clear example was the use of TikTok and Twitter in campaigns like those of Trump or Bukele<sup>1</sup>, where media impact overshadowed any in-depth analysis of their government plans.

From this introduction, we are interested in drawing the following reflections, which will serve as the main points of this essay. Firstly, technologies have played a role in the hyperreal transformation of global geopolitics. Secondly, this transformation has altered communication as we knew it—both in form and content. Thirdly, while this shift has amplified the potential for ethical or virtuous (in the Aristotelian sense) use of individual and collective capacities, it has also equipped oppressive groups and systems with tools to do harm by promoting hate or any other form of antidemocratic thought and practices. Fourthly, the dire consequences of this transformation have materialized in various forms of anti-intellectualism, a chaotic ontology or a hyperstitional politics; creating a scenario where concepts like truth or falsehood lose meaning. Lastly, this epistemological paradigm shift necessitates a fundamental redefinition of our relationship with technology; that is, the cartography towards a new foucauldian *episteme*. In this essay, we will explore the changes that communication has undergone, both in form, using "Bifo" Berardi's work<sup>2</sup>; and content by analysing the misinformation through *production studies*<sup>3</sup>. We will then delve into geopolitics through the lens of accelerationist theories and the concepts developed by the CCRU<sup>4</sup>. Finally, we will draw a cartography for a future relationship with (new) technologies, highlighting often-overlooked material aspects of the Internet and exploring new forms

of foucauldian episteme for our times. In order to define this new episteme, we will work on two ways of a possible (post) human-technology relationship: the becoming-oracle and the becoming-educator. As we will establish, in order for one to become-oracle, one first has to become-educator.

## 2. Communication (form): master's discourse

"The medium is the message." This famous phrase by Marshall McLuhan resonates more than ever today. But which is the medium nowadays? For Bifo Berardi, it is *semiocapitalism*—the shift from a *conjunctive* to a *connective* model of communication. This transformation brings about an anthropological and cognitive mutation, both at the individual level and within the sphere of informational communication. In semiocapitalism, labor consists of the multiplication, fragmentation, and combination of signs<sup>5</sup>, making everything increasingly abstract and delocalized. The author defines it as "[...] the predominant mode of production in a society where every act of transformation can be replaced by information, and the work process is carried out by recombining signs."<sup>6</sup> A clear and actual symptom of this would be the exponential increase in the hiring of teenage, GenZ or even GenAlpha community managers by companies such as KFC and Duolingo or professional football teams. These managers are tasked with running official social media accounts (on platforms like Instagram, for instance) in a manner similar to the management of *dank meme* or *shitposting* meme accounts — reterritorializing current trends, catchy phrases, and memes in order to adopt the most contemporary vernacular and foster engagement, creating a community with an audience attuned to novelty. In this process, the boundary between brand and meme becomes increasingly blurred, to the point where the brand itself evolves into a meme. On the other hand, digital influencers and celebrities produce and sell commodities and products by virtue of reframing, branding or recombining the latest meme or trend, or by selling you some *pack* of

signifiers: success, fame, *sigma life*, role models, freedom, empowerment, etc.

If we look at nowadays' politics within social media, politicians and campaigns are more focused on producing images, slogans, and symbols than on substantive proposals. Politics is not presented as a complex debate of ideas, but rather as a game of signs that are quickly disseminated and circulated. A clear, well known, and studied example is Trump's usage of Pepe the Frog meme in his 2016's campaign<sup>7</sup>, a moment that changed recent history by uniting two spheres: the digital neoreaction or *alt-right* with the, until that moment, *offline* neoliberal authoritarian populism/fascism. At the same time, platform capitalism's main product, *data*, operates within the framework of the attention economy and screen time, by the use and exploitation of signs, images and other psychic tricks to trap and captivate the user, *doomscrolling* and interacting to the point of exhaustion. The architecture of digital platforms—through the strategic use of memes, signs, and dog whistles—encourages individuals not to disengage, but to remain continuously engaged in the online 'debate,' even when it is fueled by visceral emotions and pre-rational reactions such as hate or fear. Regarding economization, communication technologies have evolved alongside capitalist development—that is, producing faster and at lower costs, even at the expense of product quality. In the case of communication, this leads to a paradox: there is more information than ever, but its quality continues to decline: “greater quantity of signs generates less and less meaning.”<sup>8</sup> The acceleration and increase in the speed of production, as well as the colonization of digital time by capital, have forced platforms to establish syntactic codes that prioritize economic performance, transmission and proliferation, accumulation, and interaction over intellectual depth and contemplative experience; resulting in a degradation, automation, homogenization, and *enshitification*<sup>2</sup> of the quality of information and platforms itself. This mutation that prioritizes fast transmission over depth meaning transformed online communication, “because meaning slows down the circulation of information [...] the faster information circulates, the faster value accumulates.”<sup>10</sup> This is the perfect reflection of the capitalist system in the digital economy, which, in order to gain

greater profit, has two options: worsen the product and/or oppress the worker.

But the fundamental difference between *conjunction* and *connection* is that in a *connective* model, all participants must preemptively accept the same syntactic code: “when humans want to participate in the connection, they must first accept the syntactic reduction of the contents of their exchange to the format of the machines that carry their signs.”<sup>11</sup> This raises critical issues: who creates the code we must accept before engaging in communication? X’s (Twitter) 280-character limit is not a major concern—but what happens when I am prohibited from using phrases like “Free Palestine” or words like “Genocide”? Elon Musk, owner of Tesla and X, is not only the master who decides the spoken language in the latter, he is a hypocritical one: from suspending accounts and censoring content that doesn’t fit with his or his colleagues’ (Trump, etc.) political beliefs, to restricting critical posts against him, all while defending “freedom of speech”. We can see that being the code master not only implies deciding the language (spanish, english, etc.) but deciding what can be said, who can say it and how it can be said; that is, defining the symbolic order, becoming the Other. Therefore, the first problem we encounter in the form of communication is that we must accept a language—and that language has a master. This has translated into the contemporary world as, for example, the decline of critical thinking and the return of mythical thinking<sup>12</sup>.

In addressing the misinformation issue we must ask ourselves, what connects misinformation with accelerationist theories? It is the algorithmic language that judges the information transmitted on networks. In this context, algorithms not only determine what is visible or accessible but also shape the way information is processed, consumed, and spread, accelerating certain narratives and suppressing others. Back to McLuhan's idea of the message, the image (which also includes slogans or memes) has superseded the *logos*<sup>13</sup>. The image, as an artifact, cannot be judged by criteria of truth or falsehood but by criteria of effectiveness. In this context information not only spreads like a virus in a burroughsian sense, moreover, as we mentioned, these processes are designed to optimize information

flows, they are not designed to think or interpret metaphors or *dog whistles*, they are (almost) incapable of distinguishing the real from the fake, so a rumor or a conspiracy theory can take much longer to be debunked. Even when false information, *fake news* or hoaxes are debunked, their material effects most of the time cannot be repaired. More often, the flows of toxic information have already wreaked havoc, leading to political, economic, material repercussions, and in extreme cases, causing harm or death. We are, therefore, no longer in the realm of epistemology understood as truth against falsehood. If we want to consider the role of what remains "human" in this "posthuman" era, it is the dimension of *sensitivity*—as Berardi describes it: "the faculty that makes possible the interpretation of signs that cannot be precisely defined in verbal terms."<sup>14</sup>

### **3. Communication (*content*): fake news, memetics and misinformation**

So, the form of communication has mutated to reach semiotic spheres where individuals share informational units laden with immense meaning (not necessarily meaningful or intellectual depth) at a very high speed, but without the necessary time to critically reflect on them. And the content? Numerous studies<sup>15</sup> place the year 2016, specifically the presidential elections in the United States, as the year when fake news reached the level of a global phenomenon. Such a phenomenon marked a shift in the landscape of contemporary global politics, social relations, ICTs, and journalism. The effects of misinformation, advanced persistent threats (or APTs), or the repeated conspiratorial actions of the far-right populism of Trump, Bolsonaro, Ayuso, or LePen, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, have had a direct impact on democratic institutions, public health, and the economy; unfortunately resulting in the loss of human lives in most cases. Misinformation is a latent risk inherent in the digitalization of media and its sometimes spectacular or sensationalist dialectic, as anyone can become a political actor with the ability to create or transmit fake news, manipulating reality. An

important feature that characterizes fake news, trolling, and misinformation is that they often use vernacular languages, memes, symbols, dog whistles, pop-culture references, and language games specific to digital communities and the world of the Internet. The generational gap regarding digital nomadism (and the process through algorithms) means that traditional mainstream media and/or people who have not grown up within the Internet culture or digital platforms are often deceived by false information, whitewash dangerous behaviors, or are easily alarmed when they cannot differentiate between truth, a joke, misinformation, an intentionally edited collage, or a fake news. This "Internet illiteracy" can increase the level of risk, alarmism, and chaos on the web, as mass media tend to cover current events and news hastily in such a careless way that, most of the time, it backfires on them<sup>16</sup>.

Understanding misinformation is also understanding the cultural context in which it arises. And this context is one of discomfort or uneasiness. This discomfort can be understood as the response to diverse crises: economic, of meaning, of identity, fear of war, ecological, and so on. On one hand, the crisis of liberal democracies after embracing a failed Thatcherian neoliberalism has devalued the quality of life while increasing its cost, destroying social spaces and services, and increasing the flexibility of privatization, debunking, and speculation. In terms of labor, the flexibility of the new subject under neoliberal entrepreneurship has resulted in extreme self-exploitation and vulnerability—conditions that were at least not present under Fordism. The cult of identity and the successful subject—the "you can do it" mantra—collapses, in the face of such vulnerability, into various episodes of emasculation, insecurity, stress, and self-blame. At the same time, a crisis of identity with a high level of hate and anger has populated the social mass composed of the "middle-but-poor" class, which, before 2008, would have been proud to belong to a social class they no longer do. After the decline of big narratives (family, religion, State) by the postmodern turn, the need for a big Other that clears the unknown has paved the path to conspiracism and mythological thinking. This new class, which Strohle names "raw bourgeoisie"<sup>17</sup>, have decided to blame the scapegoats that right-wing populism has

offered them (migrants, feminism, trans, queer, black folks, etc.), preventing them from seeing the structural dimension of this discomfort. Offering false but easy answers to what are difficult and structural problems. That being said, it is clear that in a context prone to emotional manipulation and the presence of fallacies, the use of digital and platform communication or AI would have few roles to be used ethically.

We understand misinformation as misleading information that is created, presented, and shared with the intention and ability to confuse or harm<sup>18</sup>, which can include black propaganda, a wide variety of other methods—deceptive advertising, manipulated photographs or images, forged documents, historical fabrications, fraud, parody, satire, public relations, covert operations, social engineering, troll farms, hacking, open actions—and involve various actors: state-backed media, social networks, proxies, intelligence agencies, nation-states, or cyber-criminals. The integration of the rhythms of daily life into digital platforms like X (Twitter), Instagram, or Facebook has increased the tendency of citizens to consume news on social networks for various reasons: it's cheap, easy to share, comment, and discuss<sup>19</sup>. Trolling works well because it exploits certain emotional states (emotions like anger and fear), which result in doubt, distrust, and irrational behavior characteristic of Internet discussion contexts, facilitating the transmission of fraudulent information. This is something people like Musk or Trump know very well: the algorithm prioritizes screen time, reactions, and clicks, and there's nothing that generates more of these things than visceral and emotional reactions typical of social networks. Communication via the Internet has become so toxic precisely because users and agents have previously accepted the same syntactic format of connective connection that Berardi speaks of, and this "same syntactic format" are the rules of platform capitalism: sensationalism, clickbaits, fake news, insults, memes, hate monetization, etc.

The image format, eye-catching/click-bait headlines, or "pre-digested" content that requires no effort to reflect upon are some of the reasons why fake news is preferred over information that requires time, reasoning, and patience. This dichotomy prevails in

semicapitalism as the digital transformation/mutation shifts the distinction between the time at which information travels through the Internet (and thus, not necessarily charged with epistemological validity) and the time it takes to reflect on this information. Disinformation exploits the unconscious part of news consumers, making them vulnerable to fake news. Some of these vulnerabilities include *naïve realism*—the tendency to believe one's own views are the only valid ones and that opposing opinions are wrong<sup>20</sup>—as well as various cognitive biases. These inherent human prejudices cause uncritical consumers to perceive fake news as real, making it impossible to correct their mistaken perception. In fact, presenting factual truths to them can actually increase distrust, especially within certain ideological groups<sup>21</sup>. We find a symptom of this denialism of factuality in the frequently repeated phrase (and in psychoanalysis, repetition is the engine of the symptom): “I don't believe that information because X agent (from journalists to professors, and more) is bought off by *them*.” *Them*, of course, are the jews, the woke, the swamp, the deep state, the 2030 agenda, etc. Social media has increased polarization, division, and radicalization by encouraging, exploiting, and reinforcing the echo chamber effect or the Overton window. Facebook users tend to follow people with similar views, creating ideologically homogeneous communities and groups. As a result, they only consume and discuss content that promotes ideas already present in their cognitive framework, which is already biased by advertising, consumer culture, and local or mass ideology. Groups that do not engage in critical thinking, nor debate or dialogue under the “healthy” principles of conversation, do so because they are exposed to various psychological factors<sup>22</sup>. These may include social credibility—perceiving a source as valid if the majority believes it is, especially if the truth is abrupt or uncomfortable—and frequency heuristics, the natural tendency to favor information that is heard repeatedly, including hoaxes, fake news, fallacies, or memes.

As expected, the false promise of Western technological progress has not been accompanied by a substantial improvement in the form of social communication or political increase of the *potentia*<sup>23</sup>—quite the opposite: the rhythms of capitalist production, geopolitics, and the

self suffered a mutation once merged with the digital sphere, a plateau that has absorbed the *offline* reality we once knew<sup>24</sup>, turning it into a hyperreality worthy of Black Mirror. We all laughed at the episode where characters pedaled or repeated the same scene to earn credits—until last year, when the “Ice Cream So Good” trend blew up on TikTok. In it, streamer PinkyDoll (@pinkydollreal) performed in the NPC (Non-Playable Character) style, reflecting deeper trends in digital culture, labor and human behavior. In Black Mirror, even when a black folk threatens with taking his life in the middle of the most famous show, denouncing the oppression and extreme alienation of that dystopian (but not so far) spectacle; he’s offered to do precisely that (perform a protest suicidal attempt) in front of the cameras for the rest of their life, as form of paid spectacle. One cannot but remember the famous jamesonian/fisherian insight about capitalism realism which states that there is no “outside” to capitalism and in which every form of critique becomes a spectacle that gets absorbed by the system. In Baudrillardian terms, this phenomenon is an example of hyperrealism and *simulacra*, where the line between the real and its distorted (and innocuous) representation dissolves. PinkyDoll is not a video game character, but she acts like one, and the audience participates in the game by sending her commands in the form of donations. This illustrates how reality becomes a spectacle based on repetition and simulation through the *gamification* of life and of one's own persona through the Internet. From a Marxist perspective, this trend can be seen as an extreme form of alienation<sup>25</sup>. PinkyDoll and other NPC streamers turn their physical presence into a product that responds mechanically to economic incentives. The monetization of human interaction reinforces the idea that capitalism constantly finds new, innovative ways to exploit the time and presence of workers. The audience actively takes part in the objectification of the streamer, who behaves like a machine programmed to react to monetary stimuli. These dynamics reinforce the gamification of social interactions and the transformation of people into controllable avatars.

If we take into account the viral capacity of language (moreover in its iconoclastic dimension), its cybernetic nature (and the

corresponding epistemological mutation such as the nullification of truth or falsehood), and the hyperreal construction of discourse through a certain gamification of social and political life via recursive flow of information; how has all of this affected the geopolitical context?

#### 4. Hyperstition, chaotic ontology and dog whistles

What has been the translation of this cyberpunk dystopia in the realm of geopolitics? There is a key concept to map this area: hyperstition. Hyperstition is one of the most famous concepts of the CCRU (90's Warwick University; Land, Plant, Fisher, etc.). It refers to a self-fulfilling prophecy, but to be more precise, the concept of hyperstition alludes to a performative idea that causes its own reality—a fiction that creates the future it predicts<sup>26</sup>. It is a concept that resonates with another concept —although slightly different they share the same logic—, that of preemptive war or strike, studied by Richard Grusin<sup>27</sup>. As we will see, both *preemptive strike* and *hyperstition* generate a “recursive truth”, a scenario that, for instance in the war context, produces the very threats they were purportedly meant to eliminate. In this logic, each act of violence conjures the enemy it claims to preempt; reflecting a mode of action grounded in the actualization of anticipated futures.

If superstition is the irrational belief that certain acts can influence reality in an inexplicable way, hyperstition is a causal agent within the fabric of reality. It produces the future. It's no coincidence that this concept emerged in the context of the CCRU; the historical context was ideal: the rise of cyber culture and cyberpunk, occultism, rave culture, etc. The preferred language for hyperstition is, as we said, that of algorithms, cybernetic feedback, and the digital world. It functions like a computer virus, gaining life as networked users share it; reminding us how for Butler, Nietzsche, and Foucault, truth is nothing more than forgotten repetition without an original. On top of that, the vastness of the Internet and its sewers make the creation and transmission of hyperstitions very easy: 4chan, Reddit, Twitter,

Discord... The movement of hyperstition works similarly to the speculative bubble of cryptocurrencies or NFTs: they are worth nothing more than the promise that they will be worth something, and it is this very promise that drives people to buy. Once they purchase, the price rises, self-generating its own reality. But we know that bubbles can burst, and if not, just ask the “cryptobros” who believed in Milei's pyramid scheme<sup>28</sup>. Reality, then, is a dynamic process of construction that operates at different levels. If truth and falsehood have been replaced by effectiveness (and affectiveness), lies end up constructing reality until they become real. But real(ity) might have a limit—the lacanian Real—for example, the Latinos who voted for Trump and will be deported; those, in fact, are confronting a Real(ity) that not only is difficult to put into words, it also shatters the symbolic order, the fabric of reality in which their fantasies took place once. This may constitute a valuable hypothesis for exploration in future articles.

Someone who understood the role of hyperstition in constructing narratives/reality very well is Steve Bannon. Bannon was the campaign chief who created the “starter pack” for the new authoritarian far-right populism that was imported into Bolsonaro’s Brazil, Milei’s Argentina, and Meloni’s Italy. The strategy he followed reflects the hyperstitional dimension of contemporary politics. First, he created alternative media to spread rumors, defamations, and inflammatory messages to fuel anger and hatred online. Next, he made sure that the current leader repeated the mantras found in these forums. The more encrypted and virulent the meme, the more thrilled the far-right would get. Finally, he avoided publicly endorsing these actions but also never condemned them. In this way, a closed circuit is created, where both sides influence each other without being associated, as if they were born separately and happened to cross paths by chance. The ultimate conclusion of all this “sitcom-alike” hyperreal digital politics in the spanish landscape has been Alwise, a social media alt-right agitator who runs a Telegram channel and was also involved with a newspaper run by Javier Negre, another far-right agitator, through which they spread fake news, mostly about migration and against-*wokeism* propaganda. He is now, as of today, a

Member of the European Parliament. He has ongoing criminal proceedings for those falsehoods, but after the European elections, he obtained parliamentary immunity. And not only that—with the money he is earning as an MEP, he is able to say whatever outrageous things he wants, because he has the means to pay lawyers, sue whoever he pleases, and withstand any lawsuits thrown his way, all while continuing to spread fake news left and right.

Another aspect of hyperstition that changes the paradigm of digital communication is that it doesn't operate in a linear causality. Here we can see how *preemptive strike* and *hyperstition* go hand in hand. Imagine a nation with expansionist ambitions, launching a genocidal campaign against another people, but it is portrayed in the media as a “complex armed conflict”. At the same time, the population being massacred is treated as potential reservists or fighters. Upon seeing their people being slaughtered, it is highly likely that part of the oppressed group will opt for armed defense: a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is preventive war: bombs that are dropped always find the target they're looking for<sup>29</sup>. Both preventive war and hyperstition operate within a temporal complex where present, past, and future no longer make sense. The cognitive mutation in our context has led sociologists to speak of the emergence of a preventive personality<sup>30</sup>: algorithms “know” our desires before we ourselves become aware of them; they “accurately” inform us about our desires and needs even though we do not yet know them. This situates us geopolitically in a chaotic, speculative, and profoundly anti-humanist ontology. The CCRU uses narrative figures like Pandemonium and the Numogram to illustrate this chaotic dialectics<sup>31</sup>. The Numogram is a cartography or map that represents non-linear temporality and the chaotic ontology of flows. It is a useful visual tool for understanding how our reality is constructed and transmitted through patterns of repetition, feedback, recursive fragmentation, and cycles of intensification within the system. The logic of hyperstition, and the cartography of the Numogram and Pandemonium, breaks with the principles that governed the rhythm of traditional discourse, such as temporal linearity and fixed identity. The ultimate agent of hyperstition in our time is the “dog whistle”. It is through these that we can understand the rise of the far-right through

simple communication. As hyperstition, the dog whistle is not just a sign that communicates reality; it transforms it. Since it operates on different levels within the Numogram, it allows the infiltration of reactionary imaginaries into social discourse—entering through back doors and secret portals.

The ultimate conclusion of the implementation of the semiocapitalist mutation that we referenced earlier—on the hyperstitional geopolitics—is the manipulation of reality as if it were the training of an artificial intelligence. It's enough to feed it with specific inputs and allow the feedback cycles to construct artificial intelligences (i.e. populations) that are racist, through training filled with lies. But of course, you can't simply "lie to" or "deceive" an artificial intelligence (i.e. population) that easily, because it has red lines or security codes—a minimal sense of morality. Therefore, it has to be hacked, that is, you have to move Overtone's window. How did the neoreactionaries do it? They know very well that you can't scare the machine, so you have to start by using euphemisms on one hand and appealing to real—or fabricated—problems on the other, in such a way that you gradually push the machinery until, well, we arrive at the scenario we're witnessing now. Here's when dog whistles come to play.

Dog whistles helped accelerate the processes of the echo chamber or the Overton window through the secret portals of Numogram and the Pandemonic ontology. But what are those dog whistles used by the neoreactionary hyperstitional linguistics? The neoreactionaries use a coded discourse, ancient symbols, and mythologic iconology that—through repetition, feedback, and re-signification—accelerates hyperstitional reality. Dog whistles are seemingly harmless messages that, for a specific audience, are laden with reactionary ideology. Examples include: defense of Western culture, a decaying Europe, or the Great Replacement. Let's analyze the latter. It was formulated by French writer Renaud Camus in 2011 and popularized on 4chan, 8chan, and nationalist forums<sup>32</sup>. But it has since been used by Tucker Carlson, by the neoreactionary terrorist in the 2019th Christchurch attack, and adopted by parties like Vox (Spain) or AfD (Germany) in its euphemistic form: as a "migration crisis" or "demographic

replacement". Those signs are used to mask xenophobic, supremacist, and authoritarian discourses. For the specific audience, the whistle functions as an indicator of "I am one of you". For the general public, it serves, on one hand, to integrate reactionary discourse into the general population and slowly radicalize them, and on the other hand, to protect against left-wing counter-offensives since these are "seemingly harmless signs". This "secret level" of reality's discourse functions like the Numogram, and with fewer and fewer fact-checkers in the cyber world, portals no longer have guardians. But even if they were around, it wouldn't matter: it doesn't matter whether something is true or false. The repetition of discourse transforms reality—it shapes it. The mud-slinging machine (*máquina del fango*) is a manifestation of hyperstition's power<sup>33</sup>: following accusations based on fake news from reactionary newspapers, the public image of political figures is irreparably damaged, sometimes causing devastating effects on the economy or—even more gravely, as we saw with COVID—resulting in deaths. But it can work the other way around, as we saw recently in Musk's alleged Nazi salute. Was it? Wasn't it? Doesn't matter. It generated movement on social media: those who wanted to see him as an ally saw one, those who didn't, didn't. Those who wanted to interpret it as a Nazi salute did, those who didn't, didn't. Meanwhile, techno-feudal plutocracies are making the connection between Big Tech, global governments, and fascist machinery increasingly apparent; while the counter-narrative—whether from mainstream or alternative media—dismisses this as leftist hysteria or as unjustified attacks on "innovative leaders".

If we had to explain the current context using a hyperstition, it would be the one thing *boomers* used to warn us about: don't believe everything you see on the Internet. Everyone knows the first ones to fall into that trap were those same centrists *boomers*—defenders of the status quo and digital illiterates—who failed to grasp the shift in the global society's reactionary pathos. Thus, if the ontology and epistemology of communication and geopolitics have undergone such radical changes, it is high time to create a cartography to rethink the position of the individual and their relationship with new technologies.

## 5. Becoming-oracle & becoming-educator: towards a new episteme of sensitivity

This is the landscape we're facing. Therefore, we must ask ourselves: what can we do? An optimal strategy for the posthuman is to develop sensitivity as the ability to "read the signs". In order to develop this ability or *habitus*, we must first understand the materiality of (new) technologies to comprehend what Simone Weil called *necessity* as the understanding of the universe's limits and conditions. Establishing a *working* (for Weil, *work* is what allows us to draw *attention* to the *necessity*) relationship with the raw materiality of the Internet is a "form of resistance that forces us to encounter [...] a series of intermediaries we cannot bypass, combined according to laws that no desire can alter, governed by a *necessity*"<sup>34</sup>. Necessity doesn't necessarily mean that we unveil the geometrical order of the universe *à la* Spinoza, it simply means that, for example, we understand that natural sources aren't infinite or that contamination is a real thing. Technology is also inscribed in this chaotic ontology since many people think the Internet is immaterial, but forget that it is made of cables underground, cables across oceans, metal towers, and so on<sup>35</sup>. Therefore, we must walk through the Numogram to find what lies beneath.

A first critical approach to technology would be to understand it as a reflection of our society: oppressive, racist and exploitative. Exploitive because it has been trained partly with human social activity carried out during the *boom* of the Web 2.0; on the other hand, it has been trained using intellectual property that has been stolen as a surplus value of the cognitariat: neither respected, nor compensated, nor acknowledged. As Fumagalli notes<sup>36</sup>, in biocapitalism, knowledge is exploited and the *general intellect* is expropriated through intellectual property rights. It degrades people and deprofessionalizes the work of those workers it replaces. It also invisibilizes all the human roles and labor that have contributed to the development of such technologies, feeding the mythological belief about an

autonomous artificial superintelligence. In a conference<sup>37</sup>, Marta Peirano explains how this so-called AI is neither intelligent, nor artificial, nor autonomous. Its lack of intelligence is evident not only from what has already been said, but also because it does not offer a true answer—it is a stochastic parrot. It is a probability machine that doesn't know whether it's telling the truth or a lie; it merely calculates the words that follow one another. It's not artificial either, because it has a huge material and natural base that gets forgotten. Lithium is a key mineral in the production of batteries, especially for electronic devices and electric vehicles, which are powered by AI-driven technologies, as these require efficiently stored energy. The growing demand for AI devices—such as servers and autonomous vehicles—has significantly increased the need for lithium. Lithium extraction is mainly carried out through large-scale mining, which has severe negative impacts on ecosystems. In countries like Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina, which make up the so-called “Lithium Triangle”, these impacts include: 1) lithium mining causes the destruction of natural habitats for endemic species, disrupting entire ecosystems; 2) the extraction process, particularly in salt flat mining, requires vast amounts of water and produces toxic waste, which contaminates both the soil and nearby water sources; 3) lithium extraction can lead to the local extinction of species that rely on the pristine ecosystems of salt flats and surrounding areas. Water is also a critical issue. Data centers—where the computations and data storage for AI take place—require cooling systems that often depend on large volumes of water. This can affect local water sources, especially in regions already experiencing water scarcity: 1) drawing water from nearby rivers or reservoirs to cool data centers can harm aquatic ecosystems and the communities that rely on these water sources; 2) the cooling process raises the temperature of the discharged water, which can negatively impact aquatic life and biodiversity in nearby rivers and lakes.

About the oppressive dimension in those technologies. Algorithms and AI are not an isolated phenomenon—they are the latest chapter in a long history of science and racism<sup>38</sup>, echoing the legacy of uninformed, involuntary, and non-consensual violence: from the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, to the inhumane experimentation

on racialized women and infants in the field of gynecology, to the exploitation and abuse of Henrietta Lacks at the hands of the pharmaceutical industry. We could go on with further examples of whom algorithms serve and whom they protect: like the bias in job advertisements, where men are shown higher-paying job offers more frequently than women or, in the U.S. context, where algorithms systematically deny low-income people access to healthcare, bank loans, and other essential resources. There is clear evidence of a broader economic and neocolonial agenda behind this: when ethics departments at Meta or Google release reports warning of corporate abuses and dangerous uses of AI, these same companies fire the experts involved—as in the well-known case of Timnit Gebru. Just as the term “climate change” implies a withdrawal of the human and social dimension—reducing the exploitation and destruction of the planet by capitalism’s anthropocentric actions (without necessarily addressing the issue of agency in this case)—speaking of “algorithmic bias” instead of “algorithmic oppression” repeats the gesture of evading responsibility and political accountability. It frames these patterns as mere “errors” when they are in fact rooted in deeply embedded power structures within our society<sup>39</sup>. Algorithms are nothing more than the projection of *offline* ways of reasoning—social prejudices and assumptions—onto the networked writing that connects individuals, screens, institutions, devices, laws, regulations, markets, corporations, and beyond.

Then, what ethics (or, to be more precisely, which *episteme*) should be developed for the posthuman convergence with AI and the new technologies? In a conference<sup>40</sup>, Yuval Noah Harari argued that AI has mastered human language in the sense that it has the power to affect us through the *logos*, becoming a non-organic agency similar to money or ideas such as gods. The battle for attention on social networks has already been lost: we are addicted to and ought to act by inputs, biases, suggestive levers, and casino tricks applied to Instagram, Facebook, or YouTube. Now the battle shifts from attention to intimacy. This may seem quite absurd until we realize that we talk to Alexa or Siri as if they were just another person in the house. The same AI that can convince us to buy certain items or vote for specific

politicians. Hence, we see the redline in becoming-oracle: individuals use AI as a source of information for everything. Why even search on Google if you can ask the Oracle? Why read the newspaper or watch the news if you can ask the oracle? But, we must raise a critique of Yuval. There's no need to reach the alarmism about AI, since it has only accelerated what was already inherently in the ideological nature of the individual. Parallel to the idea that Trump and Musk's new techno fascism has simply accelerated what was already wrong in democracy, then AI only accelerates what has already existed in the human condition and its relationship with symbols. As Yuval rightly says, Bill Gates' conspirationist theory of microchips is unnecessary since humans can be controlled with words. Recalling Bifo, the problem is "who sets the code we must share before speaking the language". Not a long time ago, Musk had to ban his own AI because it was suggesting on X that he was a disinformation agent<sup>41</sup>. Again, not even AI owns itself. AI represents a shift in the gnoseological paradigm, just as the techno-feudal acceleration altered geopolitics and eroded liberal democracies. This gnoseological shift has accelerated something that the humanities have been discussing for a long time: the need to enhance critical thinking. Yuval's hysteria is only comparable to the hysteria of teachers when Wikipedia first came out, only on a larger scale. There have already been oracles in the past, and now we have them in the form of guru-comedians like Peterson, Alvisé or Joe Rogan. That doesn't mean all oracles are "bad", this actually means we have the opportunity to learn how (and who) to correctly ask and, most importantly, to interpret the oracle. Like the genie, we have to be careful what we ask for. If the battle shifted from attention to intimacy, in order to create an *assemblage* with the oracle it's time to shift the battle from intimacy to sensitivity.

What does Foucault suggest to us in *The order of things*? That we must carry out an archaeology of the artifacts and knowledge in each society, *within* that society. That is to say, "according to which space of order knowledge has been constituted"<sup>42</sup>. We cannot judge the Mayan calendar in the same way that we judge Google Calendar because its *episteme* is different; because "the mode of being of things, and the order that, in distributing them, offers them to knowledge, has been

profoundly altered.”<sup>43</sup> What is the episteme of the context of AI? Not truth or falsehood, but affects. This leads us to a Spinozist ethics—one that does not require the transcendental distinction between truth and falsehood, but rather focuses on bodies and their modes of being affected. The episteme ruling AI is only dangerous because many people still believe in “bad” oracles. But it can also enhance our *potentia*, as the force that extends our condition and our capacity to be affected. In his precious teachings of Spinoza, Deleuze reminds us that “the sign is always equivocal”<sup>44</sup>: if we get burned by the sun, blaming the sun instead of seeking shade only deepens our ignorance. This might seem like an absurd example—until we realize that we blame the migration crisis on the migrants, rather than on the economic and political model that created it. This is the kind of sensitive and immanent knowledge we must pursue: the knowledge of bodies and their *affects*, of causes and effects. Again, if the sign is always equivocal, we must learn to read the signs. Therefore, the episteme that governs our relationship with AI is ultimately a pedagogical problem—for any becoming-oracle, we must first consider a becoming-educator.

Paulo Freire revolutionized pedagogy in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*<sup>45</sup>, reframing, among other things, the relationship and function of the educator with respect to the student. For Freire, education mustn't impose a worldview (the old episteme of truth and falsehood), but help to build one through a dialectic between the individual and the world around them. The educator's task is to return the student's concerns in an organized way so that they can actively, autonomously, and consciously resolve them. Our relationship with AI should be the same as that of an educator: not seeking a definitive solution from it, but finding in it a helper that allows us to learn actively and reflectively. And, even more, we could engage in a proper educator/educand relationship with technologies like Chatgpt in the same sense Freire conceives it, that is, blurring the difference of the binary educator/educand, where an educand can teach the educator, and from which the educator learns as an educand<sup>46</sup>. In contrast to banking education—where knowledge is treated as deposits to be stored, replicating dynamics of oppression—this pedagogical

approach (Freire's *dialogical education*) transforms the student into a teacher and the teacher into a student. In the case of ChatGPT, consider the moments when we correct its factual or interpretive errors (the famous *hallucinations*), highlighting a more reciprocal and dialogic mode of engagement<sup>47</sup>.

One example to conclude: a friend told me she uses ChatGPT as a kind of journal, or rather, a meta-journal. A journal is a space where we write trying to translate the chaotic torrent of thoughts, our insecurities, our anxieties and so on. What happens is that, often, our insecurities are hard to put into words or they are things we may not even be aware of. This friend says she uses ChatGPT because it allows her to "organize" this chaos that we have previously tried to organize through our own words. Isn't this what Freire means by pedagogy when he says the task of the educant is to "return to the people in an organized, systematized, and enriched form, those elements that they had originally provided in an unstructured form"<sup>48</sup>? This way of "organizing" might be the work of the educator that we should pursue in these new technologies, because ChatGPT has the ability to not only probabilistically organize discourse but also to affect us, to produce this spark, the *eureka* or the "ah, that's what it was" moment<sup>49</sup>. This should be the new *episteme*, one marked by sensitivity: not so much true or false, but how it affects the body and which potentialities enhance.

This new episteme might reflect Žižek's interpretation of Plato's *anamnesis*<sup>50</sup>. And since we are finishing with psychoanalysis, my final conclusion consists in pointing out the symptom. AI, like any process marked by progress and automation, should not be questioned by the "what", but by the "why", the "how", the "who", and the "for what". For example: why do we worry that ChatGPT is used as a "shortcut" without seeing that the society itself and the rhythms of capitalism push us to take these "shortcuts" in order to return to the frantic pace of production? As some of the readers may know, I have been a cook for over a decade. When I see pre-prepared food in the supermarket, one of my concerns is not so much the quality of the product (that's another whole thing), but why we need pre-prepared food. Could it be that food preparation takes too much time, a slowness, development

of *sensitivity* and *attention* towards *necessity*– since cooking involves the body<sup>51</sup> – that goes against the capitalist logics of acceleration, abstraction, and reduction? Back to Bifo: “The acceleration of life destroys the emotional foundations of the human being: ‘the time for emotionality can be fast, even very fast, or it can be slow, but the elaboration of sexual emotion requires time’”<sup>52</sup>. Time is required to develop the sensitivity that Bifo defines as “the faculty that makes possible the interpretation of signs that cannot be precisely defined in verbal terms.” If this act of “putting words and order to chaos” is something AI can do, as in the case of ChatGpt, then we might consider that AI is close to developing sensitivity. AI and (post)humans could teach each other these emotions and awaken the sensitivity together. This should be the new *episteme* of our technology: not intelligence, but sensitivity. Therefore, we should not worry that AI is “smarter” than humans, but that it may lack sensitivity.

## Notes:

1. María Fernanda Salas, Erica Guevara & Ignacio Siles, 2024, “Populism and social media campaigning in Central America” In *Andreu Casero-Ripollés and Paulo Carlos López-López (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Political Communication in Ibero-America* (London: Routledge), 75.
2. We will focus on his study of semiocapitalism and the psychic mutation, both individual and collective, brought about by the paradigm shift in digital communication, as explored in his works, 2007’s *Generación Post-Alfa* and 2017’s *Fenomenología del fin*.
3. Jonathan Corpus Ong & Jason Vincent A.Cabañes, 2019, “When Disinformation Studies Meets Production Studies: Social Identities and Moral Justifications in the Political Trolling Industry”, *International Journal of Communication*, 13: 5771–5790.
4. The Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU) was an experimental theory collective founded in the 1990s at the University of Warwick, known for its fusion of philosophy, cybernetics, and speculative fiction to explore the intersections of technology, culture, and capitalism.
5. Returning to a previously mentioned example in this article, Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (the MAGA movement), is the sign/signifier

produced by Trump's administration, from which later emerged Musk's MEGA (Make Europe...) or Trump's MIGA (Make Iran...), along with various products that represent the same signifier (such as the hat). As Baudrillard anticipated, sign value constitutes the dominant force in pictorial or branding capitalism, also referred to by Bifo Berardi as semiocapitalism.

6. Franco "Bifo" Berardi, 2007, *Generación Post-Alfa: patologías e imaginarios en el semiocapitalismo* (Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón), 107.

7. We recommend consulting *Appendix 1: Articles on Pepe the Frog and U.S. politics* in Seong-Young Her, 2016, "Internet Memetics", *The Philosopher's Meme*, Nov 15h, <https://thephilosophersmeme.com/2016/11/15/internetmemetics/>

8. Franco "Bifo" Berardi, 2017, *Fenomenología del fin. Sensibilidad y mutación colectiva* (Buenos Aires: Caja Negra), 132.

9. The term "enshitification" was coined by Ben Hiorns, a software developer and writer, in a post he made on Medium in 2021. In this post, Hiorns used the term to describe the decline in quality of digital services, particularly social media platforms and other tech services, as they increasingly prioritize profit over user experience.

10. Franco "Bifo" Berardi, 2017, *Fenomenología del fin. Sensibilidad y mutación colectiva* (Buenos Aires: Caja Negra), 178.

11. Franco "Bifo" Berardi, 2017, *Fenomenología del fin. Sensibilidad y mutación colectiva* (Buenos Aires: Caja Negra), 188-189.

12. This return to mythological discourse can be understood by considering several factors, among which are the decline of grand narratives in conjunction with the failure of globalist and neoliberal ethos at the end of the 20th century—in other words, the postmodern turn and its crisis in addressing the challenges of the 21st century. This occurs alongside the rise of anti-scientific thinking, the spread of conspiracism, and a return to pre-modern and mythical identities—in short, the consolidation of esoteric fascism as advocated by philosophers such as Julius Evola. The political use of nostalgia, as well as its materialization in mass culture, is a phenomenon widely studied by various authors. Due to space constraints, we cannot delve into it here, but it is closely related to the topic of our article.

13. Although the image/logos binomial may be subject to critique from a Derridean deconstruction of its logocentrism, in the context of this article we are interested in confronting a particular type of image—hyperreal, evolving in tandem with capitalism, iconoclastic, and serving as a source of accumulative value—with a discourse we may consider "truthful". This discourse corresponds to a conception of logos that is, if one prefers, closer to

a Spinozist *ethics* or to the form of *necessity* emphasized by Simone Weil.

14. Franco “Bifo” Berardi, 2017, *Fenomenología del fin. Sensibilidad y mutación colectiva* (Buenos Aires: Caja Negra), 11.
15. We highlight the following studies: Solon, 2016; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Howard et al., 2018; Bessi and Ferrara, 2016.
16. Jonathan Corpus Ong & Jason Vincent A.Cabañes, 2019, “When Disinformation Studies Meets Production Studies: Social Identities and Moral Justifications in the Political Trolling Industry”, *International Journal of Communication*, 13: 5771–5790.
17. Natascha Strobl, 2022, *La nueva derecha: Un análisis del conservadurismo radicalizado* (Argentina: Katz), 27.
18. Dean Jackson, 2017, “Issue brief: Distinguishing disinformation from propaganda, misinformation, and fake news”, *National Endowment for Democracy*, Oct 17th, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/01/countering-disinformation-effectively-an-evidence-based-policy-guide?lang=en>
19. Kai Shu, Amy Sliva, Suhang Wang, Jiliang Tang & Huan Liu, 2017, “Fake news detection on social media: A data mining perspective”. *arXiv* (Cornell University). <http://export.arxiv.org/pdf/1708.01967>
20. Kai Shu, Amy Sliva, Suhang Wang, Jiliang Tang & Huan Liu, 2017, “Fake news detection on social media: A data mining perspective”. *arXiv* (Cornell University). <http://export.arxiv.org/pdf/1708.01967>
21. Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, 2010, “When corrections fail: The persistence of political misperceptions”, *Political Behavior*, 32(2): 303–33.
22. Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, 2016, “The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model”, *Rand*, July 11th, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html>
23. “Spinoza distinguishes forms of power between *potentia*, an indwelling capacity to act, and *potestas*, a form of domination or alienation, which exploits and separates things from what they can do.” (Ruddick, 2010)
24. As in footnote 13, the offline/online binary has been widely critiqued by scholars and theorists such as Legacy Russell, the xenofeminist collective, cyberpunk writers, among others. Our intention, however, is not to assert a strict division between what occurs “outside” and “inside” the Internet, as such a distinction has progressively dissolved over recent decades. Rather, we aim to emphasize how the digital sphere—with its specific temporalities, languages, spatial logics, and modes of affect and world-making, particularly in the context of platform capitalism, web 2.0 and 3.0—has significantly shaped material geopolitical, cultural, and political practices, prior to the

emergence of the World Wide Web. This influence is particularly evident in the broader shift toward a hyperreality (in Baudrillardian terms) ruled by a society of the spectacle (following Debord), or what Franco "Bifo" Berardi terms the connective mode of production—economic, semiotic, and affective.

25. As Andrea Fumagalli suggests, alienation within the framework of cognitive capitalism reaches new totalizing dimensions, insofar as it entails the alienation of life itself and of consumption, as well as the alienation of our mental states. (Fumagalli, 2010: 238–239)

26. Delphi Carstens, 2010, "Hyperstition", *O(rphan)d(rift>)*, <https://www.orphandrifarchive.com/articles/hyperstition/>

27. Richard Grusin, 2010, *Premediation: Affect and Mediality After 9/11* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 41-45.

28. Tobias Käufer, 2025, "Argentina's Milei faces credibility crisis over crypto scam", *Deutsche Welle*, Feb 21st, <https://www.dw.com/en/argentinas-milei-faces-credibility-crisis-over-crypto-scam/a-71691738>

29. Brian Massumi, 1993, "Everywhere You Want to Be: Introduction to Fear", In *Brian Massumi (Ed.) The Politics of Everyday Fear* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 3-38.

30. Rob Horning, 2014, "Preemptive Personalization", *The New Enquiry*, Sep 11th, <https://thenewinquiry.com/blog/preemptive-personalization>

31. CCRU, "Pandemonium", *Cybernetic culture research unit*. <http://www.ccru.net/digithype/pandemonium.htm>

32. Elle Reeve, 2022, "How White 'replacement theory' evolved from elderly racists to teens online to the alleged inspiration for another racist mass homicide", *CNN*, May 21st, <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/20/us/replacement-theory-white-supremacist-buffalo-shooter>

33. In 2024, Spanish prime minister (Pedro Sanchez) had to face a serious problem of national media war similar to what we have described when talking about Steve Banon's *modus operandi*. "Mud" (*fango*) has been one of the most frequently used terms. In the public letter he shared on social media, Sánchez mentioned Umberto Eco's "mud-slinging machine" (*máquina del fango*) as "an effort to dehumanize and delegitimize the political opponent through accusations that are as scandalous as they are false."

34. Simone Weil, 1988, *Œuvres Complètes I: Premiers écrits philosophiques* (Paris: Gallimard), 372.

35. For a compelling example of a performative exploration of the Internet's hidden infrastructures, see Mario Santamaría's *Internet Tour*, which stages a collective, physical journey through the often-invisible material layers of

digital networks. [<https://www.internetour.com/>]

36. Andrea Fumagalli, 2010, *Bioeconomía y capitalismo cognitivo. Hacia un nuevo paradigma de acumulación* (Madrid: Traficantes de sueños), 23.

37. Tabakalera, 2023, "Immaterial 2023 - Marta Peirano: «Ni inteligente ni artificial»" [Vídeo]. May 15th, YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCarkmK4DzE>

38. Sandra Harding, 1991, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives* (NY: Cornell University Press), 19-50.

39. Safiya Umoja Noble, 2018, *Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism* (NY: NY University Press), 9.

40. Yuval Noah Harari, 2023, "AI and the future of humanity | Yuval Noah Harari at the Frontiers Forum" [Vídeo] May 15th. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWiM-LuRe6w>

41. ET Online. 2024. "Elon Musk's own AI Grok thinks he spreads misinformation. «Yes, there is substantial evidence and. . .»", *The Economic Times*, Nov 13th.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/magazines/panache/elon-musks-own-ai-grok-thinks-he-spreads-misinformation-yes-there-is-substantial-evidence-and-/articleshow/115259902.cms?from=mdr>

42. Michel Foucault, 2005, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (UK: Routledge), 7.

43. Michel Foucault, 2005, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (UK: Routledge), 8.

44. Gilles Deleuze, 2008, *En Medio de Spinoza* (Madrid: Cactus), 138.

45. Paulo Freire, 2020, *La pedagogía del oprimido* (Madrid: Siglo XXI)

46. Paulo Freire, 2020, *La pedagogía del oprimido* (Madrid: Siglo XXI), 72.

47. For the sake of morbid curiosity, ChatGPT itself responded to this line of inquiry with the following reflection: "Your idea nudges at something interesting: if I'm an agent that reflects human thought, then your correction of my 'errors' can be read as a pedagogical act—an inversion of authority where user and machine teach each other. In this way, the Freirean model you mentioned isn't just metaphorical—it maps onto the dynamic between a language model and its user."

48. Paulo Freire, 2020, *La pedagogía del oprimido* (Madrid: Siglo XXI), 76.

49. Evidently, this relationship runs the risk of leading to situations where, upon searching on Google for a symptom, we encounter alarming diagnostic pages (aka, my stomach hurts equals stomach cancer). Once again, this type of relational knowledge resonates with Spinoza's ethics, where learning involves prudence, embodying the experience, and mastering the art of

distances and proximities.

50. "The exit from the cave begins when one of the prisoners is not only freed from his chains (as Heidegger shows this is not at all enough to liberate him from the libidinal attachment to the shadows), but when he is forced out. This clearly must be the place for the (libidinal, but also epistemological, political and ontological) function of the master [educator]. This can only be a[n] [educator] who does neither tell me what precisely to do nor one whose instrument I could become, but must be one who just "gives me back to myself." And in a sense, one might say this could be connected to Plato's anamnesis theory (remembering what one never knew as it were) and does imply that the proper master [educator] just affirms or makes it possible for me to affirm that "I can do this" without telling me what this is and thus without telling me (too much of) who I am."

[Slavoj Žižek, 2021, *Sex and the failed absolute* (London: Bloomsbury), 261.]

51. And, for Simone Weil, *habitus*, *attention* and *work* implies thought penetrating the body.

52. Franco "Bifo" Berardi, 2017, *Fenomenología del fin. Sensibilidad y mutación colectiva* (Buenos Aires: Caja Negra), 100.

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