

HENK JASPER VAN GILS-SCHMIDT

**PRACTICAL DISORIENTATION & TRANSFORMATIVE
EXPERIENCE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING &
EXPLORING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC'S IMPACT**

Henk Jasper van Gils-Schmidt
Independent Scholar
Email: henkjaspervangils@gmail.com

Abstract: Covid-19, and the measures taken by governments in response to it, have radically changed our lives. Everything from work, school, and socializing to even simple things such as taking a walk outside or shopping for groceries is different. As it is too early to make certain predictions about the long-term impact of the pandemic on our social, political, and economic institutions, this paper aims, first, to provide a conceptual framework for making our pandemic-related experiences tangible. It is argued that two central, interconnected aspects can be explicated: our current experiences bring about both practical disorientation and epistemic transformation. The second part of this paper is explorative in nature. A possible moral upshot is explored that appears if we understand our current experiences in light of the developed framework: the disorienting, transformative experiences—by providing us the ability to cognitively model the type of experience defined by living during a severe pandemic—may be understood as providing a stable basis on which we can engage in a dialogue that expands the empathic understanding of how the pandemic impacts each of us.

Keywords: Covid-19; Pandemic; Practical Disorientation; Transformative Experience; Empathic Understanding; Empathic Access; Dialogue.

DEZORIENTAREA PRACTICĂ ȘI EXPERIENȚA TRANSFORMATOARE CA CADRU PENTRU ÎNȚELEGEREA ȘI EXPLORAREA IMPACTULUI PANDEMIEI COVID-19

Rezumat: Covid-19 și măsurile luate de guverne ca răspuns la acestea ne-au schimbat radical viața. Totul, de la muncă, școală și socializare, chiar și la lucruri simple, cum ar fi o plimbare în afara sau cumpărăturile pentru alimente este diferit. Întrucât este prea devreme pentru a face anumite predicții cu privire la impactul pe termen lung al pandemiei asupra instituțiilor noastre sociale, politice și economice, acest articol își propune, în primul rând, să ofere un cadru conceptual pentru a face tangibile experiențele noastre legate de pandemie. Se susține că pot fi explicate două aspecte centrale, interconectate: experiențele noastre actuale aduc atât dezorientare practică, cât și transformare epistemică. A doua parte a acestei lucrări este de natură exploratorie. Este explorată o posibilă revoltă morală care apare dacă înțelegem experiențele noastre actuale în lumina cadrului dezvoltat: experiențele dezorientante, transformatoare - oferindu-ne capacitatea de a modela cognitiv tipul de experiență definit de trăirea în timpul unei pandemii severe - poate fi înțeleasă oferind o bază stabilă pe baza căreia ne putem angaja într-un dialog care extinde înțelegerea empatică a impactului asupra pandemiei asupra fiecăruia dintre noi.

Cuvinte-cheie: Covid19; pandemie; dezorientare practică; experiență transformatoare; înțelegere empatică; acces empatic; dialog.

1. Introduction

Covid-19, and the measures taken by governments in response to it, have radically changed our lives. Everything from work, school, socializing to even simple things such as taking a walk outside or shopping groceries is different. As we do not know when things will start to turn to normal again—or whether this moment will ever come—it is tempting to sketch new vistas of what our personal lives and society at large will come to look like.¹ Still, it seems too early to draw any conclusions given the uncertainties surrounding the medical and scientific understanding of Covid-19, as well as the (long-term) social, political, and economic impact of the pandemic.

This paper avoids predictions regarding the pandemic's impact either on society at large or on the individual's experience and life-circumstances. Rather, in the first part, this paper provides a conceptual framework under which pandemic-related experiences are made tangible by emphasizing two central, interconnected aspects of such experiences. First, the pandemic's impact is deeply disorienting for many, causing us to not know how to go on (Section 2). This can be located in two sources: first, our self-understanding fails to provide concrete action options for the current situation and, second, a lack of knowledge regarding the virus and the pandemic's impact makes the outcomes of our actions unknowable. Second, the pandemic-related experiences are transformative by providing us with phenomenal "what it is like"-knowledge of life during a severe pandemic (Section 3). This phenomenal knowledge provides us with the ability to cognitively model such a type of experience and, based on this, how different people may respond differently to it.

The second part of the paper is explorative in its nature. Based on the provided conceptual framework and the ability to cognitively model the pandemic-related type of experience, it is explored whether such experiences have the potential to create empathic understanding for each other (Section 4).

2. Practical Disorientation: Unknowability & The Loss of Guidance

A central aspect of many of our pandemic-related experiences is a loss of habits that, under normal circumstances, constitute the main part of the actions we undertake in our daily lives. In other words, our lives are uprooted by the pandemic's impact and this puts us in a state of not knowing how to go on, i.e. in a state of practical disorientation. In her work on practical disorientation, Ami Harbin analyzes this as the epistemic challenge of 'not knowing how to go on'. Disorienting experiences are "temporally extended, major life experiences that make it difficult for individuals to know how to go on".² Normative decision theory provides us with a useful framework in which this can be stated clearly.

Normative decision theory's starting point is the ideal rational agent. This rational agent chooses between her action options based on which option maximizes her subjectively expected utility, where this utility consists of the subjective value she assigns to the outcome, weighted by the likelihood of that outcome.³ Importantly, this ideal rational agent is not a description of the kind of agent we are, but rather defines a standard that we aspire to in deliberation and action. We can understand ourselves as non-ideal agents, who fall short of this ideal in many ways: under normal conditions, we are both imperfectly informed and we are imperfect deliberators (L.A. Paul & John Quiggin have provided a formalization and an extensive exploration of what it means to be a non-ideal agent⁴). Because of these shortcomings, we make use of decision heuristics attempting to approach this ideal. For example, since we lack complete introspective access and thus do not have complete knowledge of our subjective value, we use our practical self-understanding, as a working image of the values we hold dear, to determine our subjective value.

The problem with practical disorientation is that our decision framework breaks down in the sense that our ordinary heuristics no longer function. In the current circumstances, this happens either because the agent's practical self-understanding breaks down causing a lack in action options, or because it is impossible for her to assign

expected utility to her action options due to a lack of knowledge. Both contribute to the state of not knowing how to go on, i.e. practical disorientation.

An agent lacks action options if her practical self-understanding does not provide guidance for deliberations about what to do. Let me explain this.

If you understand yourself as a caring person, a parent, or a teacher, you have reason to express yourself in your actions *as* a caring person, *as* a teacher, etc. Thus your self-understanding is not merely a description of who you are, but also an ideal of who you want to be.⁵ Understanding yourself as a teacher makes you want to express yourself in light of the ideal you have of being a teacher: you find it valuable, for example, to prepare classes well, to comfort students in distress, to grade fairly, and to teach not only the content of the class but also engender capabilities in your students for later in life. A self-understanding is thus not an abstract, flexible entity: to understand yourself as a teacher is to have a specific understanding that you express in the concrete actions you undertake and the habitual scripts you have established. These self-understandings may vary in important, consequential ways even among roles that ostensibly are similar. For instance, a natural part of your teacher's self-understanding may be to comfort students in distress, but for another teacher this would be out of the question, as her practical self-understanding may not include this role as an ideal to strive for.

Practical disorientation occurs when this guiding function of one's practical self-understanding (i.e. this decision heuristic) is disrupted such that there are no concrete action options.⁶ Two ways in which the current pandemic is disorienting, I contend, is that either many of our ways of understanding ourselves do not apply any more, or we do not have a self-understanding that is applicable to the situation at hand. In both cases, our self-understanding fails to provide action options among which we can choose. For example, due to social distancing, we cannot (easily) meet with friends and family and we have to find new ways to fill our free time. Stay-at-home orders isolate us and make it so we cannot go about our work as usual: some of us can work from home, but without any guidance provided by our self-

understanding, we struggle. Others have lost their jobs and may not know how they will provide for their family or pay next month's rent—they need to give meaning to how they are able to understand themselves as unemployed. Beyond huge disruptions, life has been altered in many small but important ways: How to greet one another without shaking hands, or how to put on a mask when walking in close contact down the corridor of a supermarket? Thus one source of practical disorientation caused by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is that our habits, choices, and actions—grounded in our self-understandings—are disrupted.

A second source of practical disorientation is the uncertainty caused by the pandemic: a lack of information prevents us from estimating the effects of our actions. Thus, we cannot judge how likely it is that an effect we want to result from our actions will result. This kind of uncertainty can be explicated within the normative decision theoretical framework introduced above. For this we need to contrast the garden-variety uncertainty that is involved in most, if not all, our decisions from what we can call “uncertainty as unknowability”. The former is the uncertainty that is ascribed to a specific outcome in terms of the probability assignment: all outcomes of our action options are ascribed a certain probability by which we express the knowledge-based uncertainty of whether the outcome will obtain (with uncertainty occurring when there is more than one possible outcome).⁷ The latter type, uncertainty as *unknowability*, is characterized by holding that the outcome of our action cannot be defined—a problem central to the phenomenon of transformative experiences (expanded on in the next section). This unknowability is prior to the problem of whether probabilities and subjective value can be assigned to constitute the expected utility.⁸

With unknowability, it is impossible to create an action perspective in terms of expected utility maximization, because the outcomes of the actions open to us are unknown. It seems plausible to interpret the pandemic's impact in terms of uncertainty as unknowability: for example, we do not know how the virus will affect us once infected or when an effective vaccine will come on the market; we neither know

when the lockdowns will be lifted or whether, and in what way, the economy will rebound afterwards; we also lack fundamental knowledge regarding how the virus exactly is transmitted, whether we are infectious despite a lack of symptoms, and how severe the disease will be (and for which demographics). The lack of knowledge about all of these things makes the outcomes of our actions unknowable to us. On an individual level, for example, is it impossible to determine the possible outcomes of visiting family and friends. This kind of unknowability that can be understood as a cause of practical disorientation, of not knowing how to go on, as well. Since we are unable to define the possible courses of action and their expected utility, we are at a loss—without guidance—of what to do.

Both causes thus make it impossible for a person to choose due to the breakdown in her decision framework: either because no action options are provided by her practical self-understanding or because a lack of knowledge makes the outcomes of her actions unknowable. In both cases, the agent is incapable of knowing which action will maximize her subjectively expected utility. Thus she is at a loss for what to do. Her decision framework has broken down.

The take-away message is that the pandemic's impact—formulated on a higher-order level—confronts us with the fragility and vulnerability of our own agency. Living our lives undisrupted, our self-understanding hardly ever fails to provide guidance: it offers concrete action options to which we can assign expected utilities. Further, we typically know the probabilities of the possible outcomes. With the guiding function of our self-understanding disrupted, together with the lack of knowledge due to the pandemic, the normal functioning of our agency breaks down—our decision heuristics fail us. This lays the intrinsic vulnerability of our agency bare. Of course, how this vulnerability is realized on the lower-order, concrete level of individuals' circumstances may vary widely—it may make a difference to how one is disoriented, and thus experience one's agential vulnerability, whether one loses one job, whether one can work from home (and whether one has children at home), and whether one's job is presumed to be essential.

3. Transformative Experiences: The Ability to Cognitive Model New Experiences

An important, related aspect of our current experiences is that they are epistemically transformative. Since no one has experienced a pandemic of this size and impact before, going through this gives us new knowledge of what it is like to live through such an experience.

To explicate this, we can draw on L.A. Paul's work on transformative experiences. Paul has argued that you can only learn "what it is like to have truly new types of experiences [...] by actually having an experience of that type".⁹ In other words, an experience is epistemically transformative by providing you with 'what it is like'(WIL)-knowledge of a new type of experience. A central example used by Paul is parenthood: you do not know what it is like to be a parent unless you go through pregnancy, hold your child for the first time, and have the sudden responsibility for the care of your child. This gives you the knowledge of what it is like for you to be a parent.

In light of the Covid-19 pandemic, we can easily observe that many experiences we have are epistemically transformative by forcing a shift in our lifestyle. This is reflected in small things, such as hand shaking, wearing a mask in the supermarket, or maintaining social distance. There are also transformative experiences with a deeper impact: many people experience what it feels like to stay at home or even to lose their livelihood; others experience the pain of not being able to be with their loved ones to give and receive support, for example after losing a family member or friend due to Covid-19 or not.

Here we find a deep connection between practical disorientation and transformative experience. As stated, practical disorientation is the experience of not knowing how to go on, caused by either a lack of guidance by one's practical self-understanding or a lack of knowledge. A transformative experience is exactly defined by facing something new: as the result of the impending epistemic and personal transformation, you are unable to plan and build models regarding what to do, which creates disorientation and decision problems. Thus, in other

words, in the case of the pandemic's impact, disorientation is the response to transformation.

An important upshot of the epistemic transformative experience, which allows us to transition to the explorative part of this paper, is that experiencing a new type of experience gives you the ability to cognitively model it. To put this point negatively: as long as you have not experienced an instance of a specific type of experience, it is challenging to imagine what it means to undergo it. This ability to cognitively model a specific type of experience thus enables you to imagine the possible ways yourself and others may respond to such a type of experience.¹⁰ John McCoy, L.A. Paul and Tomer Ullman provide an in-depth exploration, from both a philosophical and empirical perspective, of the process of cognitively modeling.¹¹ They understand cognitive modeling as an important way in which people explore psychological possibilities: either as “counterfactual reasoning about self-involving possibilities” (both past and future) or as reasoning about others and their perspective on the world.¹² Thus, the ability of cognitive modeling is important for imagining how experiences may be personally transformative; i.e. the range of possible ways it may affect others and ourselves.

For the purposes of this paper, the aspect I want to focus on is that without the ability to cognitively model the phenomenal quality of a certain type of experience, we are in danger of being, and staying, blind for the experience of others, how they may respond to undergoing this experience, and the ways the experience may (personally) transform them. The upshot for the following, explorative part of this paper is that the ability to cognitively model a certain type of experience allows us to relate to others who undergo the same or similar experiences. One potential pitfall—embedded in explorations of the following section—is that we may assume too quickly, once we have had a certain type of experience, that we can cognitively model exactly what this experience means for the other. Due to the fact that the personal, on the ground situations of people may differ radically, people may also be affected in different ways—and in ways we would not immediately imagine ourselves. Thus we should be wary of

assuming that, with this ability, we immediately grasp the full meaning of the experience for the other.

4. Exploring a Potential Moral Upshot: Empathy with Each Other

The breakdown of our decision framework must not be understood such that only negative consequences follow. For one thing, it could be that the lack of possibilities to express ourselves, and the necessity to rethink our self-understanding, provides us both time for self-reflection and room for re-orientation in our lives. In the second half of this paper however, I want to leave such potential personal beneficial aspects aside and explore a potential moral upshot of how this framework may offer a distinctive route to empathy and the empathic understanding of each other. The idea is that disorienting, transformative experience—as a higher-order kind of experience shared by many—provides a small but shared cornerstone to engage in a dialogue about the differences in our on the ground situation that brings about greater empathic understanding of each other’s situation. In the spirit of the explorative project, I will introduce some critical questions along the way without providing a final answer on whether empathy can be obtained.

For starters, I want to bring out a distinctive feature of the worldwide phenomenon caused by Covid-19. This begins with a problem with transformative experience discussed in the foregoing section: if you haven’t had a specific type of transformative experience, it is challenging to cognitively model that type of experience. As a consequence, you are unable to anticipate how you yourself will respond to it and, moreover, you cannot imagine (model) how it is for another person to undergo such a type of experience. In other words, you lack the phenomenal quality of the experience to imagine what it means to have the experience and the range of ways it could affect others and yourself. As Casey R. Johnson formulates this, if “you’ve never had to see obstacles where others don’t, you won’t be as

sensitive to your lack of vision” and thus unaware of the gap in the set of experiences we’ve lived through.¹³ Johnson points out, subsequently, that such gaps make it difficult to empathize with one another, since they make it impossible to cognitively model the kind of experience the other talks about and thus to imagine, let alone empathize with, her perspective.¹⁴

This problem is especially poignant when we need an empathic understanding of the other’s perspective. For example, if you aren’t deaf yourself, it is almost impossible to get a feeling for how it is for a person to be deaf. Even more so, if a deaf person values her deafness because of the Deaf community she is part of, this may be difficult to understand from an empathic perspective because you cannot cognitively model what it means for the deaf person to be part of this community. Perhaps all the experiences you would have to miss out on if you’re deaf spring too easily to mind. In a similar way, if you haven’t experienced grief yourself, it is almost impossible to imagine the deeply disorienting feeling of losing your partner in life. The failure to empathize is brought about by the sheer fact that you cannot cognitively model what the other experiences.

What is distinctive of this worldwide pandemic is that the inaccessibility of the other’s experience—due to a lack in WIL-knowledge—does not seem to apply. Over the globe, we are all experiencing the transformative experience of living through a severe pandemic and the disorientation that comes with it: our societies have been brought to a halt, we are required to change deeply ingrained habits, and we need to practice social distance by, for example, keeping inside as much as possible. In other words, around the globe, we are all engaged in the same project of trying to get a grip on the outbreak of the virus and fighting the impact it has on our societies and economies. It is this structure that may provide a distinctive route to empathic understanding, since sharing in the same type of experience allows us to cognitively model this type of experience and the possible impact it can have on others.

One immediate problem that arises is that the pandemic’s impact may vary so widely that it cannot be claimed that people have the

same experience. For example, some experience disorientation because they have lost their jobs, others because they need to develop new habits of working from home, and yet others have jobs assigned as essential and thus are required to continue to work. These experiences do not seem to constitute a shared base that provides the ground for empathic understanding. If one is capable of modeling the experience of working from home, both the experience of having lost one's job and to be required to go in to work—with all the dangers of getting infected—could be radically different experiences that one is not automatically capable of modeling.

A possible response to this is to acknowledge that, indeed, under the influence of the pandemic, people have widely diverse experiences, but that the empathic understanding we are looking for need not be so demanding. Rather, a less-demanding empathic understanding, grounded on our collective disorientation in response to the higher level transformative experience of the pandemic, is sufficient to provide the basis to start a dialogue about the differences between our specific situations. In the paper quoted above, Johnson argues that even if people have nothing in common, an empathic basis for a dialogue on the ways in which their situation and their experiences are different can be found, if all acknowledge their epistemic limits in trying to model to the perspective of the other. Such a dialogue, Johnson hopes, can provide further, and a more thorough, empathic understanding of the situation of the other.

One might worry that some people are much less affected by the pandemic—for example, the very rich. However, the forms of unknowability pointed out above also affect the rich: in planning their life and actions, they are also dependent on knowledge about whether there will be a vaccine, or even a treatment, and when; whether there will be a second wave, and when; etc. Moreover, although the very rich may have more means to give expression to their self-understanding, in all likelihood, it has also been necessary for them to adapt to the pandemic's circumstances. For example, they are also, specific to their own circumstances, impacted by social distancing and by the shut-down of public life. Whether widely divergent experiences of

disorientation between people undermine the basis for a dialogue about the differences in each other's situation is an open question.

What the developed conceptual framework does help to make clear, I hope, is that we are offered, on a higher-order level, a shared ground that *may* be used for a dialogue aimed at a greater empathic understanding of the situation of the other. We all experience practical disorientation and are therein confronted with our agential vulnerability, even if the concrete ways in which this happens depend on our specific situations. In other words, it is on this higher-order level that we gain the ability to cognitively model the type of experience that we are sharing. Based on this ability, we can start a dialogue on how the details of the current situation are *different* for the other.

A further condition that may be required is a basic interest in gaining an understanding of the situation of the other and how this situation shapes her perspective, her view. Moreover, in order for empathy to grow, we also need to let this knowledge affect us. We might be skeptical whether such a kind of openness for the perspective of the other actually exists, due to the polarization of (Western) societies over recent years. Whether such interest exists is an open empirical question.

Having said this, if we are capable of engaging in such a dialogue, perhaps the effects may extend beyond the current pandemic. For example, in light of the tremendous rise in unemployment in many countries, the pandemic seems to make a broader group of people experience the uncertainty that characterizes daily life of people in poorer regions of society. Many people thought to have a secure job—such as teachers—may suddenly gain insight into the living situation of many part-time workers and workers with insecure jobs. Moreover, access to healthcare has been disrupted across the board, making it possible for those who are used to secure benefits to relate to the instability of care common for the poor and uninsured. Such experiences may provide a basis for a dialogue about our differences that transcends the current situation; because there is a shared experience of disorientation, we gain *empathic access* to the different life-world of the other.

More research on the potential impact of the pandemic is required. However, I hope that the conceptual framework I have introduced offers an interesting perspective for further inquiry, both philosophical and empirical.

5. Concluding Remarks

I want to end this paper by proposing two additional avenues. The first is to explore collective experience and collective action from within the framework developed in the first part. In this paper, the focus has been on the individual's pandemic-related experiences and the disorientation they bring about. However, this disorienting aspect can also be located on a collective level. The current pandemic lays bare the weaknesses in our (globally-entwined) societies. Governments are in the dark regarding what the right restriction measures are. They don't know how to open up their countries again, nor how the pandemic will affect things at the socioeconomic level. Health care officials lack medical knowledge of how the virus is transmitted, how it evolves, what underlying conditions make the course of the disease worse, and what treatments may be successful. In other words, the lack of knowledge also creates practical disorientation on the collective level. As a consequence, in terms of collective actions, it is unclear what we should do. It would be interesting to take on the exercise to work this through.

The second avenue comes from an important feature of transformative experiences that has not been the focus of this paper: namely, it's personally transformative nature.¹⁵ To return to the example of parenthood: gaining WIL-knowledge of being a parent may change the values and preferences you have. Say, without children, you value going out with friends, pursuing your career, and going to the cinema; as a parent you may come to value spending time with family, going home early to see your kids, and catching up with sleep. i.e. The WIL-knowledge of being a parent affects the values under which you find your life worth living. Likewise, the forced shift in our lifestyles may also force a shift in our preferences and values, since

many of our habitual ways of interacting with the world are not possible anymore. A significant example is how we are all confronted with the fact that our decisions and actions, unintentionally, shape and affect the life of others in both beneficial and disastrous ways. For example, without having any symptoms, we can infect others—who may become seriously ill, get hospitalized, or even die; or by neglecting to implement social distancing, we impact those working in the care system by flooding hospitals and ICUs. Thus although the actual transformation in our values and preferences due to the pandemic's impact cannot be determined through philosophical reflection is, it can be a worthwhile exercise to explore possible pathways along which such change may take place.

To conclude, I have developed a conceptual framework under which we can make sense of our experiences caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. I have suggested to understand these experiences as disorienting and transformative in which our practical self-understanding fails to offer action options and in which unknowability makes it impossible to determine outcomes and values of our actions. The second half of this paper explores, within the proposed framework, how the experience of the pandemic relates to our empathic and thus our moral understanding.

***Acknowledgments:** The author wishes to express his gratitude towards the participants of the CH409 Lab Meeting, Yale University; L.A. Paul, Yale University; Paul E. Stillman, Yale University; Elena Schmidt, Yale University*

Notes

- ¹ As some philosophers have done in the public domain. See for a critical review of these attempts: Warwick Anderson, "Epidemic Philosophy", on <http://somatosphere.net/2020/epidemic-philosophy.html/> (April 8, 2020). Last visited: April 29, 2020.
- ² Ami Harbin, *Disorientation and Moral Life* (New York: Oxford UP, 2016), 2.

- 3 For a formalization within the context of transformative experiences, see Richard Pettigrew, *Choosing for Changing Selves* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2019).
- 4 L.A. Paul & John Quiggin. "Real World Problems", in *Episteme* 15:3, 2018: 363-382.
- 5 See Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Source of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) and Robert B. Pippin, *The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005) for a defense of this interpretation of agency).
- 6 For a defense of this interpretation, see my unpublished manuscript "Grounding The Moral Value of Practical Disorientation: Phenomenal Knowledge & Agential Humility".
- 7 For a nuanced discussion of this type of uncertainty that distinguishes three types, see Clare Chua Chow, Rakesh & K. Sarin, "Known, Unknown, and Unknowable Uncertainties", in *Theory and Decision* 52, 2002: 127–138.
- 8 For a more thorough analysis and conceptualization of uncertainty within a normative decision theoretical framework, see Giuseppe Fontana & Bill Gerrard, "Post Keynesian theory of decision making under uncertainty", in *Journal of Economic psychology* 25, 2004: 619-637.
- 9 L.A. Paul, *Transformative Experience* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014), 13.
- 10 We skip over the central problem introduced by Paul based on this inability to cognitively model our response—namely, that it is impossible to rationally choose to undergo a transformative experience. I feel justified in this, since the experiences we focus on overcome a person and are not chosen by her.
- 11 John McCoy, L. A. Paul, Tomer Ullman. "Modal Prospection". *Metaphysics and Cognitive Science*, eds. Alvin I. Goldman and Brian P. McLaughlin, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2019), 235-267.
- 12 John McCoy, Laurie A. Paul, Tomer Ullman. "Modal Prospection": 235.
- 13 Casey R. Johnson, "Intellectual Humility and Empathy by Analogy", in *Topoi*, 38, 2019: 224.
- 14 Casey R. Johnson, "Intellectual Humility and Empathy by Analogy".
- 15 L.A. Paul, *Transformative Experience*.

References

- Anderson, Warwick (April 8, 2020). "Epidemic Philosophy". <http://somatosphere.net/2020/epidemic-philosophy.html/> (Last visited: April 29, 2020)
- Chua Chow, Clare & Sarin, Rakesh K. 2002. "Known, Unknown, and Unknowable Uncertainties". *Theory and Decision* 52: 127–138. DOI: 10.1023/A:1015544715608
- Fontana, Giuseppe & Gerrard, Bill. 2004. "Post Keynesian theory of decision making under uncertainty". *Journal of Economic psychology* 25: 619-637. DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2003.11.001
- Harbin, Ami. 2016. *Disorientation and Moral Life* (New York: Oxford UP).
- Johnson, Casey R. 2019. "Intellectual Humility and Empathy by Analogy". *Topoi* 38: 221–228. DOI: 10.1007/s11245-017-9453-0
- Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996. *The Source of Normativity*. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).
- McCoy, John, Paul, L. A., Ullman, Tomer. 2019. "Modal Prospection". *Metaphysics and Cognitive Science*. Eds. Alvin I. Goldman and Brian P. McLaughlin. (Oxford: Oxford UP): 235-267.
- Paul, L.A. 2014. *Transformative Experience*. (Oxford: Oxford UP).
- Paul, L.A & Quiggin, John. 2018. "Real World Problems". *Episteme* 15:3: 363-382. DOI: 10.1017/epi.2018.28
- Pettigrew, Richard. 2019. *Choosing for Changing Selves*. (Oxford: Oxford UP).
- Pippin, Robert B. 2005. *The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath*. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).